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TAXATION

Must the IRS Individually Assess
the General Partners to Collect the Partnership's
Delinquent Employment Taxes?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of Tnited States Supreme Court Cases, pages 180-185. © 2003 American Bar Association.

The Galletti respondents filed their
joint voluntary chapter 13 petition
on October 20, 1999, and Briguglio
respondents filed a joint voluntary
chapter 13 petition on February 4,
2000. The IRS filed proof of claims
in both respondents' bankruptcy
cases after the three-year statute of
limitations expired. The IRS's claim
against the Gallettis, in the amount
of S395,006, consisted of more than
S240,000 in penalties and interest
that had accumulated in the five- to
six-year period between the date the
partnership taxes were first due and
the date of the Gallettis' bankruptcy
petition. The IRS's claim against the
Briguglios, in the amount of
S403,264, consisted of more than
S265,000 in penalties and interest
that had accumulated in a five- to
six-and-a-half-year period between
the partnership tax due date and
the Briguglios' bankruptcy petition.

Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. He can be reached
at ralph.anzivino@marquette.edu
or 414-288-7094.

ISSUE
Is the Internal Revenue Service
required to assess the general partners of a partnership individually in
order to collect the partnership's
delinquent employment taxes from
the general partners, or is assessment against only the partnership
sufficient?

FACTS
Respondents are general partners of
a partnership. The partnership filed
federal employment tax returns
showing balances owed at various
times between 1992 and 1995. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
made timely assessments (within
the three-year time limit) of the taxes shown on those returns against
the partnership between 1992 and
1996. The IRS did not make any
assessments against the partners
individually, nor did it provide any
notice to or demand for payment
from the partners. The IRS did,
however, file notices of federal tax
liens against the general partners.

Respondents objected to the IRS's
proof of claims. Respondents
acknowledged that, as general part-
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ners, they are liable for all lawful
debts of the partnership under state
law and that the assessments of the
employment taxes against the partnership were timely and valid. They
contended, however, that federal
law prohibits the collection of the
tax liabilities of the partnership
from its partners unless a separate
assessment of the taxes has been
made against the partners individually. They further contended that
the United States is now barred by
26 U.S.C. § 6501(a) from making
such assessments against the partners because the three-year statute
of limitations has expired.
In response, the United States maintains that the assessments against
the partnership were timely and
valid and that the liability of the
general partners for the resulting
debt of the partnership arises under
state law, not the Internal Revenue
Code. Accordingly, when a valid
assessment has been made of the
tax liability of the partnership, no
additional, individual assessment
against the general partners is
required by federal law to proceed
against the partners for their
liability.
The bankruptcy courts disallowed
the United States's claims, and the
district courts affirmed. In re
Galletti, 2001 WL 752652 (C.D. Cal.
2001); In re Briguglio, 2001 WL
429820 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Both
courts relied on the proposition that
"a valid assessment is a prerequisite
to tax collection," quoting El Paso
Refining, Inc. v. IRS, 205 B.R. 497,
499 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996). Both
courts held that the employment
taxes owed by the partnership must
be assessed against the general partners individually before they could
be collected directly from them.
Since no assessment had been made
against the general partners individually within the three-year limitation period, both courts concluded

that the United States's claims were
barred.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. In re
Galletti, 314 F.3d 336 (9th Cir.
2002). The Ninth Circuit noted that,
under the Internal Revenue Code,
the IRS is to collect tax deficiencies
by making an assessment against
the taxpayer within three years of
the filing of the taxpayer's return.
The court reasoned that respondents, as general partners, are taxpayers who are subject to assessment for the employment taxes
owed by the partnership. The court
noted that the term "taxpayer" is
defined in the Code as any person
subject to any internal revenue tax.
In addition, the Code defines the
word "person" to include an individual as well as a partnership. Relying
on these definitions, the court concluded that the partnership is a taxpayer and each individual general
partner is a separate taxpayer. Thus,
the court held that the timely
assessments against the partnership
extended the statute of limitations
only with respect to the partnership
and left unaltered the limitations
period applicable to respondents.
Because the government did not
assess the partnership's tax liabilities against the general partners
individually within three years after
the partnership returns were filed,
the court held that the government
is barred from collecting those taxes
from respondents. The United
States appealed, and certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court on
June 23, 2003. U.S. v. Galletti, 123
S.Ct. 2606 (2003).
CASE ANALYSIS
The IRS maintains that it may
enforce the derivative liability of
general partners for tax debts owed
by their partnership without making
a separate assessment against the
individual partners. Their position is
based on state law, not federal law.

In this case, the IRS made a timely
assessment of federal employment
tax obligations owed by the partnership. When the partnership failed to
pay, the United States sought to
enforce the tax liability against the
general partners, who are liable
under state law for all valid debts of
the partnership. The IRS contends
that the Ninth Circuit erred by misapprehending the essential nature of
the IRS's claim. The derivative
claim against the general partners
for the recovery of taxes owed by
the partnership is based on state
partnership law, which specifies that
all general partners are jointly and
severally liable for all obligations of
the partnership.While federal law
creates the debt of the partnership
for their employment taxes, it is
state law that makes the general
partners derivatively liable for that
debt.
Under state partnership principles,
it is well established that general
partners are personally liable for the
debts and liabilities of the partnership, including its tax liability.
Accordingly, when a valid obligation
of the partnership exists under federal law, that lawful debt of the partnership may be enforced directly
against the general partners under
state law. In this case, the uncontroverted record establishes that: (1)
timely assessments of the partnership's tax liabilities were made within the three-year period allowed by
26 U.S.C. § 6501(a); (2) those timely assessments extended the time
for collection of those tax liabilities
for an additional 10-year period;
and (3) the 10-year period has not
yet expired. Therefore, the existence of the partnership debt and
the liability of the general partners
for that debt under state law are
both irrefutable.
The IRS further notes that no individual assessment of general partners is required by the Internal
(Continued on Page 182)
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Revenue Code to permit the collection of partnership taxes from its
general partners. Without directly
challenging the established rule that
general partners are liable for the
valid debts of their partnerships
under state law, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that these taxes could
not be collected from the partners
because they had been assessed by
the IRS only against the partnership
and not directly against the partners. This conclusion is based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of
the function and nature of an
assessment under the Internal
Revenue Code. The Code does not
require that separate assessments
be made for each partner in order
to enforce their derivative liability
for partnership taxes under state
law. An assessment is merely a formal record of the amount of tax that
is due. Once the amount of a tax is
determined and recorded in an
assessment, the commissioner may
enforce that liability against any
party that is directly or derivatively
liable for it.
Section 6201(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury to make
assessments of all taxes imposed by
the Code. The assessment contemplated by and referred to in the
Code is the assessment of the tax.
The commissioner's assessment list,
which the commissioner actually
signs when he makes an assessment
of the tax, does not contain the
names of any taxpayer but contains
only the amounts and the total tax.
The assessment of a tax is thus
essentially a bookkeeping notation
that serves as a formal record of the
amount of the tax liability. The
commissioner's practice in this
regard has remained consistent for
the past 65 years. In this case, it is
undisputed that a timely assessment
of the taxes owed by the partnership was made. No other or further
assessment of these taxes is con-

templated or required by the Code.
Thus, the only assessment required
by the Code was the assessment
against the partnership.
The IRS maintains that its practices
follow a straightforward application
of the law. When the IRS makes a
timely assessment of a tax, two
important consequences ensue.
First, after a tax is assessed, the IRS
may employ administrative enforcement methods such as tax liens and
levies to collect the outstanding tax.
Second, when a timely assessment
is made, the time within which the
IRS may collect the tax either
administratively or by a proceeding
in court is extended to 10 years
after the date of assessment.
In the present case, the IRS properly made a timely assessment of the
taxes owed by the partnership. The
federal taxes at issue are imposed
directly on the employer. The Code
provides that every employer who is
required to deduct employment taxes shall be liable for the payment of
such tax. Thus, when the partnership paid wages to its employees, it
created employment tax liabilities
for itself, as the employer under federal law. The government made a
timely assessment of those taxes
within the three-year period allowed
by the Code. That timely assessment extended for 10 years the
period in which a judicial action
could be commenced to collect that
liability. The extension of the collection period applies without regard to
the identity of the party against
whom the action is commenced.
And it applies equally to a proceeding against a taxpayer who is directly liable for a tax and to a proceeding against a person who is derivatively liable for it. The current proceeding in court to collect the
assessed taxes was begun within 10
years after the assessment of the
tax. Therefore, it is timely as a matter of federal law.

The IRS argues that the Ninth
Circuit incorrectly rejected this
straightforward application of the
Code. The court failed to understand
that, when a valid assessment is
made of the tax owed by the person
directly or primarily liable, no further or separate assessment is
required before a collection action
may proceed against individuals who
are derivatively liable for the tax.
The IRS believes that the Code itself
reveals the error of the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation. The Code
provides that the amount of any tax
imposed shall be assessed within
three years after the partnership
return is filed, making clear that it
is the amount of the tax, not the
taxpayer or person derivatively
liable, that must be assessed.
Similarly, the Code provides that,
where the assessment of any tax has
been timely made, suit may be
brought to collect the tax within 10
years after assessment. This statutory language confirms that Congress
contemplated a single assessment of
any tax and that such assessment
would trigger the 10-year period
without regard to the identity of the
person or persons ultimately found
liable to pay the tax. Nothing in the
text of the Code provides any support for the Ninth Circuit's contrary
view that "individual assessments"
against each potentially liable person are required.
The government further asserts that
its reading of the statutory text is
confirmed by a long-established
body of case law holding in a variety
of contexts that tax collection
actions may proceed against derivatively liable persons in the absence
of a separate individual assessment.
In each of the following situations,
the courts have held that no separate assessment was required to collect a tax from one who was derivatively liable: a transferee's derivative
liability for taxes owed by a trans-
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feror corporation; an executor's
derivative liability for taxes owed by
the decedent; and a donee's derivative liability for unpaid gift taxes
owed by the donor. In each case,
the court reasoned that it is the
"tax" and not the "taxpayer" that is
assessed.
Finally, the IRS argues that the
Ninth Circuit's decision would create severe and impracticable burdens for routine enforcement of the
tax laws. The IRS states that there
are currently outstanding partnership employment tax liabilities in
excess of $10 billion that have been
assessed in a timely manner but for
which separate assessments have
not been made against the general
partners individually. The decision
of the Ninth Circuit would bar collection of those liabilities from individual general partners in cases in
which the ordinary three-year period for assessment of taxes has
expired.
It is undisputed that general partners are jointly and severally liable
for all outstanding debts of the partnership under state law. Until now,
the IRS has typically pursued collection of partnership tax obligations
from the partnerships before commencing litigation with the general
partners to satisfy outstanding tax
obligations. Under the abbreviated
limitations period that would result
from this decision, the government
would be forced to bring collection
suits against the general partners
within the three-year period, even
though parallel efforts against the
partnership may remain ongoing. A
requirement that such duplicative
proceedings be pursued would be
burdensome for general partners as
well as for the government. It would
subject general partners to the
necessity of litigation over matters
that the partnership itself should
routinely resolve.

Respondents argue that the individual general partners of a general
partnership are primarily, not derivatively, liable under state law. Thus,
they are taxpayers who must either
be sued or assessed within the
three-year period. Virtually every
state in the United States has statutory and case law that states that
general partners of a partnership are
liable for all the debts of the general
partnership. The nexus between a
general partnership and its general
partners is substantively different
than the relationship between other
taxpayers and the parties which the
IRS might seek to hold secondarily
liable.
A general partner is jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of
a partnership's tax debt simply by
virtue of being a general partner at
the time the tax debt arose. Black's
Law Dictionary defines joint and
several liabilit, as the liability of
copromisors of the same performance when each of them, individually, has the duty of fully performing
the obligation, and the obligee can
sue all or any of them upon breach
of performance. Such liability permits the IRS to collect a tax from
one or all of several taxpayers. For
example, a husband and wife who
file a joint income tax return are
collectively and individually liable
for the full amount of the tax liability. Thus, the partners as co-obligors
on the tax liability were required to
be assessed within the three-year
period. The courts have properly
sustained the respondents' objections to the IRS's proof of claims
because the claims were not
assessed against the general partners individually within the threeyear limitation period.
While respondents believe that the
general partners are primarily liable
for the partnership tax liability,
even if the general partners are see-

ondarily liable, the general partners
are still entitled to be individually
assessed. The United States uses the
concept of secondary or derivative
liability but fails to provide a definition. There are a number of different kinds of secondary liability for a
tax owed by a taxpayer. Secondary
liability can arise under state law or
federal law. For example, pursuant
to the Code, secondary liability for a
tax is imposed under the responsible person section, the lender liability section, and the transferee liability section. Interestingly, none of
the provisions involving secondary
liability permit the IRS to take
administrative collection action
against those asserted to be secondarily liable unless the IRS has
made a separate assessment against
that person. Thus, whether the general partners are primarily or secondarily liable, they are entitled to be
individually assessed.
Respondents maintain that the
Code anticipates a broad interpretation of those persons entitled to
notice of a tax deficiency. I.R.C. §
6201 authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury to make assessments
imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code with respect to taxes shown
on "balance due" returns filed by
taxpayers, which is the case here.
Section 6203, entitled "Method of
Assessment," states that the assessment shall be made by recording
the liability of the taxpayer in the
office of the Secretary in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary. The regulations provide for recording of both
the amount of the tax liability and
the names of the persons liable for
the tax liability. I.R.C. § 6303 provides that the Secretary shall, as
soon as practicable, and within 60
days after the making of an assessment, iive notice to each person
liable for the unpaid tax, stating the
amount and demanding payment.
This notice "shall be left at the
(Continued on Page 1,S4)
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dwelling or usual place of business
of such person, or shall be sent by
mail to such person's last known
address." Failure to provide the taxpayer with proper notice and
demand within 60 days of the
assessment bars the IRS from taking
administrative collection action
against the taxpayer and stops the
running of interest on the tax debt.
There is no doubt that a general
partner of a general partnership, by
virtue of their joint and several liability, is a person liable for the
unpaid tax of the partnership. Thus,
the partners are entitled to their
own separate assessment, notice
and demand.
Similarly, the notice provisions for
establishing a tax lien suggest a
broad interpretation of those persons entitled to notice of a tax deficiency. I.R.C. § 6321 provides that if
any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same
after demand, the amount shall be a
lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to
property belonging to such persons.
The Section 6321 lien attaches to
only the property of the person who
is liable for the tax. I.R.C. § 6323
provides for the filing of a notice of
federal tax lien to perfect the IRS's
lien against third parties. Thus, if a
taxpayer is assessed a tax, is given
timely notice and demand, and
thereafter fails to pay the tax, the
next step is for the IRS to file a
notice of federal tax lien against the
taxpayer to perfect its lien. The
Code provides the taxpayer with
administrative and judicial appeal
rights when the IRS has filed a
notice of federal tax lien. Where the
IRS has filed a notice of federal tax
lien against a person liable for the
tax, that person may appeal the
IRS's decision to file a notice of federal tax lien. I.R.C. § 6330 provides
that the IRS may not levy on any
property or right to property of any
person unless the Secretary has

notified such person in writing of
their right to a hearing. Clearly, due
process of law would mandate a
broad interpretation of those persons entitled to notice of the IRS's
pending lien rights. The Code and
associated regulations provide a
comprehensive scheme that provides fair notice to those primarily
liable for the tax. Certainly that
must include the general partners of
a partnership who are primarily
liable for the partnership debt.
Alternatively, respondents assert
that if the partners are not the taxpayers, their liability arises only
under state law and enforcement is
governed by the state's limitation
periods. In the absence of California
law providing that general partners
are liable for the debts of their partnership, the United States would
have no right to pursue respondents
in their capacity as general partners
for the partnership tax debt. Thus,
the United States is not asserting
rights against respondents according
to federal law. The fact that federal
law prescribes additional procedures
to assist the IRS in collecting the
tax does not mean that the basis for
primary liability is federal law.
Rather, the primary basis is state
partnership law. The limitations
periods for asserting liability against
respondents under California law is
decidedly not a federal period of
limitations. The California period of
limitations is three years. The government's claim against the general
partners, then, is barred because it
was initiated after the California
three-year period of limitations.
Finally, respondents maintain that
the IRS's current collection practices do not comport with due
process of law. The IRS files notices
of federal tax liens against general
partners to secure payment of partnership taxes without assessing the
partners individually and without
giving the individual partners notice
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and demand. The IRS also levies on
the property of general partners to
collect partnership taxes without
assessing the partners individually
and without giving them individual
notices and demand for payment.
The IRS has argued that notice and
demand to the partnership operates
as notice and demand to the general
partners.
Respondents argue that the IRS's
practice in this regard is clearly suspect. The protections and procedural safeguards afforded under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guarantee the procedures necessary for the protection
of ultimate decency in a civilized
society. Although many controversies have raged about the cryptic
and abstract words of the Due
Process Clause, there can be no
doubt that at a minimum what the
Constitution does require is an
opportunity for notice granted at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The IRS's procedures
hardly seem to comport with the
fundamental fairness of an opportunity granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.
Respondents acknowledge the
important governmental interest in
collecting taxes. However, the burden on the IRS to assess, and to give
notice and demand for payment to
the individual general partners, is
negligible compared to the harmthe continuing accumulation of
interest and penalties without the
individual partner's receipt of notice
and the ability to pay the tax and/or
dispute the debt. Surely, 13 years of
accumulated interest and penalties,
without recourse, is not fundamentally fair.
SIGNIFICANCE
A partnership is one of a number of
business associations in which individuals can choose to conduct their
business. In fiscal year 2002,
approximately 2.2 million partner-
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ships filed information returns with
the IRS. Obviously, there are a significant number of people in the
United States who are conducting
some part of their business in partnership form.
The IRS's current practice for the
recovery of delinquent taxes owed
by a partnership (such as Social
Security or withholding taxes) is to
assess the partnership and not the
general partners. Coincidentally, the
IRS files federal tax liens against the
general partners and levies execution on the partners' property. The
IRS maintains that assessment and
notice to the partnership is sufficient notice to the general partners.
The general partners disagree with
the IRS's practice. The partners
assert that since they are primarily
liable for the delinquent partnership
taxes, they are entitled to be
assessed and notified individually.
In this case, the IRS did not attempt
to assess the individual partners
until the statute of limitations on
assessments/collection had expired.
It is estimated that nearly $10 billion will be lost by the government
if the Supreme Court concludes that
general partners as well as the partnership are required to be assessed
for delinquent partnership taxes.
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